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ABSTRACT 
A radiation tolerant testbed was designed using a Commercial-Off-the-Self Digital 
Signal Processor and presented to prove the concept of Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) 
processors in order to make a COTS DSP radiation tolerant design. The system was 
designed to handle the effects of radiation associated with Single Event Upset only. 
Two of the industry's leading programmable 32-bit floating-point digital signal 
processors were reviewed for this thesis, Analog Devices ADSP-21060 and the Texas 
Instruments TMS320C6701. The '6701 was the best processor for this design based upon 
size, power, speed, and tolerance to single event latchup, signal event burnout, and total 
ionization dose. A review of the processor's performance and characteristics is provided to 
ensure the proper operation of '6701 in a TMR design. 
The system employs a bit by bit voter that compares the three processors' results 
and outputs the majority of the bits. All data, address, and control signals are monitored to 
determine that the system is operating properly. This system significantly differs from 
previous TMR designs, because only address errors cause immediate interrupts. Data errors 
cause processor interrupts only when the errors accumulate to a critical level. An external 
host processor controls the processors' shared memory space. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Radiation tolerant digital signal processors have not kept pace technologically with 
other digital signal processors that do not need to operate in the rigorous environment of 
space. The traditional approach of radiation hardening has not allowed for the inexpensive 
and quick development of designs suitable for space. This thesis offers one solution to the 
difficulties of the space deployment of digital signal processors, while providing for less 
expensive components and more flexibility in the end product application. 
A radiation tolerant testbed was designed using a Commercial-Off-the-Self Digital 
Signal Processor and presented to prove the concept of Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) 
processors in order to make a COTS DSP radiation tolerant design. The system was 
designed to handle the effects of radiation associated with Single Event Upset only. 
Two of the industry's leading programmable 32-bit floating-point digital signal 
processors were reviewed for this thesis, Analog Devices ADSP-21060 and the Texas 
Instruments TMS320C6701. The '6701 was the best processor for this design based upon 
size, power, speed, and tolerance to single event latchup, signal event burnout, and total 
ionization dose. A review of the processor's performance and characteristics is provided to 
ensure the proper operation of '6701 in a TMR design. 
The system employs a bit by bit voter that compares the three processors' results 
and outputs the majority of the bits. All data, address, and control signals are monitored to 
determine that the system is operating properly. This system significantly differs from 
previous TMR designs, because only address errors cause immediate interrupts. Data errors 
xv 
cause processor interrupts only when the errors accumulate to a critical level. An external 
host processor controls the processors' shared memory space. 
xvi 
I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
Digital signal processing is an area of study that has advanced rapidly over the 
past 30 years. The rapid development of very-large-scale integration (VLSI) of electronic 
circuits has spurred the development of more powerful, smaller, faster, and cheaper 
digital signal processors.   Special purpose signal processors were introduced in the 1980s 
and advanced rapidly during the 1990s. The first processors were simple 8-bit fixed point 
processors that have advanced to today's 32-bit fixed or floating-point processors that can 
perform up to 1.1 billion instructions per second. The advantages of using digital signal 
processing over analog techniques include increased stability, reduced noise 
susceptibility, re-programmability, and high immunity to factors such as component 
aging, loss of precision, and temperature variations. These inexpensive and relatively fast 
processors have made it possible to build highly sophisticated digital systems capable of 
performing complex digital signal processing functions and tasks. Hence many of the 
signal processing tasks that were performed by analog circuits can now be done cheaper, 
more reliably and with decreased power requirements with a digital signal processor 
implementation. Therefore, it was natural to adapt these processors for space-based 
applications that range from signal processing, image processing, attitude control, and 
power management [Ref. 1]. 
B.        SPACE RADIATION ENVIROMENT 
The space environment requires a designer to take special precautions that are not 
required inside the earth's atmosphere. This environment poses a risk to all earth-orbiting 
satellites and missions to other planets in the form of electromagnetic radiation from the 
sun: not only visible light, but the entire range from radio to gamma rays. In addition to 
solar radiation, a satellite design has to deal with ionization particles of the sun and 
distant stars. Some of this is trapped within the earth's magnetic field forming the intense 
radiation of the Van Allen Belts [Ref. 2]. 
Radiation is the process of emitting radiant energy in the from of waves or 
particles. Most of the radiation in space near to Earth comes from the sun, as fusion in 
the sun shoots particles and radiates energy in the form of waves. The particles emitted 
by the sun become deflected or trapped by the Earth's magnetic field. The harmful high- 
energy waves are absorbed by particles in the upper atmosphere [Ref. 2]. 
Particles can come in a variety of forms classified in two groups, heavy and light 
ions. The light ion will be either a proton or a beta particle (electron). The proton is the 
simplest positive ion and is a fundamental particle with a small mass. The beta particle is 
the simplest negatively charged ion and also has a small mass. Stripping the two 
electrons from a helium atom creates the alpha particle. The classifications of ions as 
heavy or light is dependent on the atomic number of the element. All ions with two or 
more protons/neutrons are classified as heavy ions [Ref. 3]. 
Unlike particles emitted by the sun and other celestial objects the waves or 
photons emitted by them have neither mass nor charge. Gamma Rays are an example of 
photon radiation. 
The sun dominates the sources of radiation in space near earth. Solar activity on 
the sun varies over an 11-year cycle, producing a variable average of solar particles. 
Though solar activity is predictable on a macro scale, the sun still produces a wide 
variation in radiation intensity on a day-to-day basis [Ref. 3]. 
A second type of particle radiation is the Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR), which 
consists of are particles that reach earth from sources outside the solar system. Cosmic 
rays are heavy ions produced from cosmic events such as exploding stars. 
The largest contributor to a spacecraft's total dose is particles trapped by the 
earth's magnetic field. These particles come mainly from the sun but also from other 
celestial bodies. The particles create the region in space known as the Van Allen Belts. 
The belts are a fixed hazard to spacecraft and are distributed non-uniformly within the 
magnetosphere. 
From these sources of radiation two factors, Total Ionization Dosage (TID) and 
Single Event Effects (SEE) are calculated to determine the survivability of spacecraft and 
their electronics. The Total Ionization Dosage (TDD) is the total amount of radiation that 
can be absorbed during a spacecraft's lifetime before failure. TID creates bulk-oxide and 
interface-trap charge that reduces transistor gain and shifts the operating properties (e.g., 
threshold voltage) of semiconductor devices. TID accumulation will cause a device to 
fail in the following ways: the transistor threshold voltage shifts far enough to cause 
circuit malfunction; the device fails to operate at the required frequency; or electrical 
isolation between devices is lost. All electronic devices experience the effects of TED, 
and these effects cannot be mitigated after the design and manufacturing process. 
Therefore, we will focus on the second type of radiation effects, the single event effects. 
Single Event Effects (SEE) consists of three different phenomena. They are single 
event upset (SEU), single event latchup (SEL) and the single event burnout (SEB). SEE 
are random events that occur when spacecraft are exposed to radiation. As the spacecraft 
orbit the earth, it is continuously exposed to radiation, some of which passes through their 
external shell and affect the spacecraft subsystems. When radiation interacts with 
microelectronic devices, it can cause behaviors that are unpredictable and potentially 
damaging. They are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
C.        SINGLE EVENT EFFECTS 
SEEs occur when high-energy particles pass through microelectronic device and 
deposit enough energy to cause a transistor to change state. In most cases this is a 
transient effect occurring only long enough for the charge to be absorbed by the system. 
The transistor's state change can lead to latchup in parasitic transistors, high current state 
in a power transistor, or can be latched into a storage element. These three main types of 
SEE in complimentary Metal Oxide Semiconductors (CMOS) are discussed in the 
following sections [Ref. 3]. 
1.   Single Event Upset 
An SEU is an unpredicted change of state or "bit flip" caused by a high-energy 
particle passing through a device. In a microprocessor a bit flip could cause a processor 
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to branch to an unexpected location in memory thus causing a program to crash. In 
microprocessors, SEUs are typically grouped into two types: program run errors and data 
errors. Program run errors are errors that occur in control logic, program counter, or any 
other register that determines the state of processor. Data errors are typically confined to 
data registers and cache. These two types of error are not necessarily exclusive. A data 
error could occur in a register that is later used as a program address. When the 
microprocessor reads the address held in that register it is going to run the wrong code 
located at that address or even an invalid address [Ref. 3]. 
2.   Single Event Latchup (SEL) 
Integrated circuits are made by combining adjacent p-type and n-type regions into 
transistors. By the nature of the process, parasitic transistors are formed along alternate 
paths through the circuit. Normally, these parasitic transistors are biased off by the circuit 
design. Latchup occurs when the charge, such as that produced by a particle, activates 
one of these parasitic transistors, which forms into a circuit with large positive feedback. 
This creates a short circuit across the device, with two possible outcomes. The first is the 
current drawn through the parasitic transistor generates more heat than the device can 
dissipate and burns out. If the device is able to dissipate the heat, the large amount of 
current drawn through the parasitic transistor prevents the circuit from functioning 
correctly, which is a non-destructive SEL. The normal symptom of a non-destructive 
SEL is a hung system, which requires power to be cycled before proper operations can be 
restored [Ref. 3]. 
3.   Single Event Burnout (SEB) 
SEB is another condition that can cause device destruction. It is caused by a 
single ion that induces a high current state in a MOSFET destroying the circuit [Ref. 3]. 
D.       PURPOSE 
One approach to building radiation tolerant electronics is to design and build them 
on an electrical insulator. The process of building on an electrically insulator is often 
called radiation hardening (Radhard). Another approach to fault tolerant computing is to 
design a fault tolerant architecture. The goal of this research is the testing and 
implementation of a fault tolerant computer system using a COTS programmable digital 
signal processor that is capable of operating in the presence of radiation induced SEUs. 
This design does not take into account total dose radiation, which is a factor that 
usually limits the operational lifetime of spacecraft electronics. This factor is determined 
by the electrical properties of solid-state components exposed to radiation over a period 
of time.   Ultimately the long exposure to radiation leads to changes in the component 
parameters outside of design specifications and causes the circuit to cease proper 
functioning. This factor must be addressed by spacecraft shielding, component selection 
and survivability, and not by system architecture. Other factors that must be addressed 
are SEL and SEB. These two phenomena can be limited by external power monitoring 
devices. Implementation of power monitoring devices will be left to follow-on studies. 
Successful completion of this project will lead to numerous benefits for the space 
community. First, the adage of faster better cheaper can be utilized in the development of 
spacecraft. The spacecraft engineer will have a broader choice of devices and software to 
choose from at a reduced cost. The spacecraft design will no longer be restricted to the 
use of radhard components. 
Second, the fault tolerant system can be utilized as a testbed to analyze software 
fault tolerant programs. The fault tolerance hardware is able to detect the SEU and log 
the time and kind of an upset. The software can then be observed in the manner in which 
it handles the error. This testbed will allow the testing of software in a simulated space 
environment prior to use in orbit. 
Last, the system can be utilized as a hybrid fault tolerant computer system. In this 
configuration, the processor is additionally monitored for SEU. Upon detecting an upset, 
the processor is restored to the state prior to the upset. The processor then continues 
execution from the point prior to the upset with little downtime and no loss of data. This 
is dramatically different from current operations where a processor is reset when an error 
occurs, resulting in downtime, loss of data and/or spacecraft availability. As shown, this 
is a major advance in the handling of spacecraft system failures. 
E.       RADHARD VERSUS COTS 
The radiation effects discussed in the previous sections, with the exception of 
SEUs, are destructive in nature. The main way of reducing their effects is by utilizing 
radiation hardened (radhard) devices or by providing shielding. A radhard device is one 
that is specifically designed to be able to withstand higher amounts of radiation than 
standard commercial parts. 
Determining the suitability of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) signal processor 
for space applications is a subject of ongoing research. To adapt COTS devices for space 
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a limited amount of radiation hardening is necessary to resist the effects of TID, SEL, and 
SEB. There are multiple reasons for utilizing a COTS device in the harsh environment of 
space. This section will present a few of the rationale leading to the use of COTS. 
1.   Cost of Development of Radhard Devices 
The small percentage of the overall market that requires radhard components puts 
severe economic constraints on the companies that produce these devices. The number of 
companies developing and marketing radhard devices is rapidly on the decline and the 
remaining companies are not developing new chip designs. For these reasons, the 
development of radhard devices is lagging behind state of the art technology by two or 
more generations. As an example, a spacecraft launched into space at present would have 
at best the equivalent of a Analog Devices ADSP-21020 25 MHz DSP that can execute 
50 MFLOPS sustained performance compared to the current generation Texas Instrument 
(TFM) TMS320C6701 167 MHz processor that can execute sustained performance 668 
MFLOPS. This entire order of magnitude difference in processor capability makes the 
COTS processor especially appealing [Ref. 8 and 9]. 
a.   High development Cost of Radhard Devices 
Low demand and little profit exist in the production of radhard devices, 
which has led to many manufacturers abandoning their production of radhard devices in 
favor of the more lucrative, higher volume consumer electronics. The limited availability 
of these devices then leads to an inflation of the cost. Part cost directly impacts the cost 
of the product. In a time of shrinking budgets, the spacecraft engineer is looking for a 
cheaper suitable product. The best alternative is the development of hardware and 
software fault tolerant designs with non-radhard COTS [Ref. 3]. 
To produce the radhard ADSP-21020 (RH-21020) required 22 months 
from the beginning of the process to having a working prototype for delivery. This was a 
successful transfer of a commercial design to a radhard process. There was a tremendous 
amount of money and resources that were dedicated by the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL), Analog Devices and Lockheed Martin to jointly transfer the 
technology from standard silicon design to a radhard design. Though this was successful, 
it was very risky and had it not succeeded, all of those resources would have been wasted. 
Even with the backing of the AFRL the program for the technology transfer ran short of 
funding and a complete debugging of test programs and test patterns could not be 
completed [Ref. 8]. 
b.   Cost for Software 
Even the use of a commercial design for a radhard process does not 
guarantee that the software will be fully compatible. Advertised as a fully compatible 
family of processors, the earlier generations of ADSP-21xxx are actually of an older 
design, which have fewer functions without all the capabilities of the new processors in 
the normal 21 xxx family. Therefore, modifications to the software will be required. 
Furthermore, the older design will require extensive testing, all of which adds to the cost 
of choosing a radhard design. 
2. Benefits of Radhard 
With the use of a radhard device, a known error rate can be calculated and 
compared with COTS. One error every ten years is achievable in radiation tolerant 
designs. This compares to a COTS device that can have an error rate of anywhere 
between several an hour to several a day or more [Ref. 9]. Radhard devices are also 
designed for the rigorous space environment of wide temperature swings and high 
vibrations. COTS devices may have a much narrow window of tolerances. 
3. Cost of Using COTS 
Since COTS devices are susceptible to radiation effects, a device will first need to 
be tested for its tolerance to destructive effects of radiation, such as TID, SEL and SEB. 
Once a suitable commercial product is found, its implementation will still require 
protection from SEU. This can be achieved either through software redundancy, 
hardware redundancy or a combination of the two. It is notable that a software 
redundancy is not always a useful solution for microprocessors, because each instruction 
would have to be executed at least twice and then results compared. This effectively cuts 
the processor speed by a minimum of one-half. Hardware redundancy also has its 
drawbacks. It requires an increase in power, circuit size and weight. 
4.   Benefits of COTS 
The most apparent benefits of using COTS are lower cost of components, little or 
no need for special software, no restrictions on availability, faster processor speeds, and 
use of current design ICs. Because of the use of COTS we have eliminated the costly and 
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time consuming design phase of transferring a technology to a radhard design and 
replaced it with a cheaper and faster screening process of radiation testing of commercial 
devices. By using current generation processors, the COTS processor has better 
availability and fastest processing speeds than radhard processors. There will also be 
extensive technical support by the manufacture that is not always available in older 
radhard processor designs. 
F.        RELATED WORK 
The investigation into use of COTS is an on going research project at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. There are many ways to mitigate the harmful affects of a SEU. 
Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) systems are an accepted means of dealing with the 
affects of SEU; a detailed discussion follows in this thesis. Prior work includes the 
following theses. LT John Payne, USN, this work included the initial proposal for a 
TMR system for a microprocessor, based upon the IDT™ R3081 [Ref. 2]. Capt. Dave 
Summer's, USMC, thesis continued upon John's work by implementing the design into 
programmable logic devices and completing the design [Ref. 4]. Capt. Summer's work 
finalized the layout of the system architecture and it was built for testing. Capt. Susan 
Groening, USMC and LT Kimberly Whitehouse, USN designed the operating system and 
interrupt handling routine necessary to operate a TMR R3081 [Ref. 5]. LT Damen 
Hofhienz, USN, followed the previous work by verifying the layout and tested the printed 
TMR circuit board [Ref. 3]. LT Hofhienz' work also included recommendations for a 
space-flight-ready design as a follow on. LTjg Huseyin Ekin, Turkish Navy, is 
conducting research into adapting a 64-bit microprocessor vice the 32-bit microprocessor 
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that was used in the previous TMR design. This thesis adapts the TMR design to a COTS 
32-bit programmable digital signal processor. 
G.       THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this thesis follows the design approach used in developing the 
system. Chapter I has been a brief introduction of the environment in which the system 
will be operating. Chapter II is a discussion on processor selection and justification. 
Chapter DI considers effect of SEU and architectural solutions to corruption of the 
processor's operation. Chapter IV will present the triple modular redundant testbed 
design. Chapter V presents the conclusions developed during this research and discusses 
topics for follow-on work. 
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II.  PROCESSOR SELECTION 
A. CHARACTERISTICS 
The logical place to start to design a general-purpose digital signal processing 
system is to set some system parameters. Since this DSP system is to be used as a design 
test-bed, it is unknown how it ultimately will be implemented. Therefore, the design 
includes as many possible configurations to allow a following designer greater flexibility. 
As a rule for this project as many functions of the digital signal processor as possible will 
be implemented. Some other basic requirements are that it must have floating point 
capabilities and be programmable. 
B. GENERAL PURPOSE DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSOR VS GENERAL 
PURPOSE MICROPROCESSOR 
So, why use a general purpose DSP over an already proven general-purpose 
microprocessor? The answer to this question requires a review of how DSP is performed. 
The core of DSP relies upon the use of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and filtering, 
both of which have very repetitive simple mathematics structures. A FFT is shown in 





























Figure 1. Eight Point Radix-2 FFT [From: Ref. 1]. 
An important aspect of the FFT structure is the repetitive nature of the algorithm. 
A closer look at the example of an eight point FFT in Figure 1 reveals that in order to 
complete stage one, 8 real multiplies and 12 real adds are required, resulting in 8 complex 
numbers. Stage two and beyond require 16 real multiplies and 40 real adds, resulting in 8 
complex numbers. Table 1 demonstrates how much computational power is required to 
do the basic FFTs. To maximize throughput, it is best to keep as many of the objects 
being operated on either in registers or on-chip memory. 
Real Multiplications Real Additions 
n Radix 2 Radix 4 Radix 8 Radix 2 Radix 4 Radix 8 
16 24 20 152 148 
32 88 408 
64 264 208 204 1032 976 972 
128 712 2504 
256 1800 1392 5896 5488 
512 4360 3204 13566 12420 
1024 10248 7856 30726 28336 
Table 1. Real additions and Multiplications Required to Perform an N Point FFT 
[From: Ref. 1]. 
Since it is inevitable that results will need to be stored to memory, an efficient 
means of storage is necessary. With general-purpose processors, all addressing is either 
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linear direct addressing or linear indirect addressing. In the FFT it is desirable to store 
data in a circular buffer, stepped through by a constant value. A general-purpose digital 
signal processor allows for circular addressing and removes the required overhead needed 
to achieve the same results as a general-purpose microprocessor would. 
C. SIZE, PINOUT, POWER 
In a design for space applications, the size, pinout and power consumption are 
important factors affecting a spacecraft's cost. A spacecraft can cost between 50,000- 
70,000 dollars per kilogram when placed into orbit. A higher power requirement for any 
given device demands increased amounts of solar cells and batteries. Therefore, this adds 
to the overall weight of the design and thus increases the costs. Likewise, the more pins 
required directly effects the size of the device and therefore more space will be required, 
increasing the weight of the spacecraft. These three factors are important to a spacecraft's 
design consideration and cannot be ignored [Ref. 2]. 
D. ON-CHIP MEMORY SIZE 
It is very common in DSP that a short section of program code will be executed 
many times over a large group of data. In order to help decrease the processing time, it is 
important to be able to have single-cycle-access-times to memory in order to avoid 
halting the CPU to wait for data. On-chip memory often has multiple busses that allow 
for multiple access to internal memory. With multiple busses to memory, two different 
functional units can access two different memory locations in one clock-cycle. This is 
something that cannot be achieved with a single 32-bit external-memory-bus. 
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E.        SPEED 
The speed of a processor is not strictly determined by the clock rate; it is a 
combination of on-chip memory access time, CPU speed, ability to transfer large blocks 
of data and the speed with which the processor interacts with external devices and 
memory. With higher CPU clock speeds, a more robust set of applications can be 
performed. In analyzing speed performance for a DSP system, it is more important to 
focus on number of clock cycles (time) to execute a radix-2 FFT than it is to focus on 
how many floating-point operations per second (FLOPS). 
F.        PROCESSOR REVIEW 
As part of this research, several digital signal processors were analyzed based on 
the discussion in the preceding section. Table 2 contains the data concerning the two 
final DSP that were considered in developing the testbed [Ref. 6]. 
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Feature TMS320C6701 ADSP-21060 Feature TMS320C6701 ADSP-21060 
IEEE Floating point 
support 
Yes Yes Accumulator Size 80 80 
Native 32 fixed point 
support 
Yes Yes 64 bit product Yes Yes 
Internal SRAM size 1Mbit 4 Mbit Register file to 
memory bandwidth 
128 bits/cycle 64 bits/cycle 
Dual ported internal 
memory 




Number of serial ports 2 2 Complexity of hand- 
optimized assembly 
Highly complex, 









Supported in 2 
ways, cluster and 
links 
Supported in 2 
ways, cluster and 
links 
Number of circular 
buffers supported 
8 (only two 
different lengths 
allowed, has to be 
power of two) 
32 (different 
length for each 
buffer allowed) 






Zero overhead DMA No (there is cycle 
stealing from the 
Yes FIR filter code size 100 instructions 
(assumed) 
25 instructions 
Number of registers 32 16 Typical power 
dissipation 
Not Available 1.5 Wat 3.3V 
Package Size 352 ball, 
35mmX35mm 
225 ball, 23mm on 
aside 
Table 2. Digital Signal Processors. 
The processor chosen was the TMS320C6701 general-purpose digital signal 
processor manufactured by Texas Instruments (TFM). The reasons for this selection were 
many. From the outset of this research project, the intent was to choose a COTS device 
for the TMR design. The '6701 is a COTS device, single chip, Harvard Architecture, 
with a 32-bit data bus and a 19-bit address bus. The processor has many glueless 
interfaces to external devices therefore minimizing the need for additional off chip 
control logic. This latter feature is also true of the Analog Devices ADSP-21060. 
The determining factor was the failure of ADSP-21060 in a radiation environment 
[Ref. 10]. While the'6701 has not yet been tested, pending funds Dr. James Anderson of 
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Anderson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will test it. The outcome of those 
tests will determine how far this project can proceed, because TID, SEB or destructive 
SEL are a function of the processor's manufacture and cannot be corrected with extra 
hardware or software. However, it should be noted that some radiation effects could be 
diminished with shielding, as with a piece of aluminum. 
G.       CHARARACTERISTICS OF THE SELECTED PROCESSOR 
The TMS320C6701 is intended to provide high-speed floating-point signal 
processing. It is a modified Harvard Architecture device. It has an instruction set that is 
similar to a reduced-instruction-set-computer (RISC), which employs load/store 
architecture. It operates on low voltage (3.3 V) and has power-down capabilities to 
conserve power. It also has many glueless architecture features built into the processor to 
reduce the number of off-chip components. This decreases the size and power 
requirements for external ICs which would be required to implement the design. Some of 
the features of TMS320C6701 include: [Ref. 9] 
8.3 or, 6.7 ns Instruction Cycle Time (selectable) 
Eight 32-Bit Instructions/Cycle 
1 GFLOPS 
Very Long Instruction Word (VLIW) 'C67x CPU Core 
Eight Highly Independent Functional Units: 
Four ALUs (Floating- and Fixed-Point) 
Two ALUs (Fixed-Point) 
Two Multipliers (Floating- and Fixed-Point) 
Load-Store Architecture With 32 32-bit general-purpose registers 
Instruction Packing Reduces Code Size 
All Instructions Conditional 
Hardware Support for IEEE Single-Precision Instructions Floating-Point 
Hardware Support for IEEE Double-Precision Instructions Floating-Point 
Byte-Addressable (8-, 16-, 32-Bit Data) 
512K-Bit Internal Program/Cache (16K 32-Bit Instructions) 
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512K-Bit Dual-Access Internal Data (64K Bytes) 
32-Bit External Memory Interface (EMIF) 
Glueless Interface to Synchronous Memories: SDRAM and SBSRAM 
Glueless Interface to Asynchronous Memories: SRAM and EPROM 
52M-Byte Addressable External Memory Space 
Four-Channel Bootloading 
Direct-Memory-Access (DMA) Controller with an Auxiliary Channel 
16-Bit Host-Port Interface (HPI) with access to Entire Memory Map 
Two Multichannel Buffered Serial Ports (McBSPs) 
Up to 256 Channels Each 
Two 32-Bit General-Purpose Timers 
Flexible Phase-Locked-Loop (PLL) Clock Generator 
352-Pin Ball Grid Array (BGA) Package (GJC Suffix) 
0.18-mm/5-Level Metal Process 
CMOS Technology 
3.3-V I/Os, 1.8-V Internal (120-, 150-MHz) 
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Figure 2. Block Diagram TMS320C6701 [From: Ref. 12]. 
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1.  The CPU 
The CPU is a 32-bit RISC type floating/fix point execution engine, capable of 
executing one to eight instructions per clock cycle. It has a variable stage pipeline that 
can execute an instruction from a minimum of 7 stages to a maximum of 14 stages 
dependent upon the type of instruction. The CPU is divided into two execution paths, A 
and B. Each execution path contains functional units L, S, M, and D. It also includes 32 
32-bit registers that are divided into two groups of 16 registers, one servicing data path A 
and the other servicing data path B [Ref. 12]. 
a.   Pipeline Structure 
All instructions flow through the fetch, decode, and execute stages of the 
pipeline. The fetch stage of the pipeline has four phases for all instructions, and the 
decode stage has two phases for all instructions. The execute stage of the pipeline 
requires a varying number of clock cycles, depending on the type of instruction. The 
stages for '6701 are show in Figure 3. 
H      i 
 Fetch - Dispatch 
1 I I I I I 1 1 T" 
Execute  
J l ' ' ' ' i i i 
Figure 3. Pipeline Stages [From: Ref. 10]. 
(1) Program Fetch. Program fetch occupies the first 4 cycles of 
the pipeline, and consists of program address generation, program address send, program 
access ready wait, program fetch packet receive. It is important to note that the processor 
fetches eight instructions each time a program fetch cycle is initiated, so all fetch 
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addresses end with two zeros. Therefore if a program branches to a location that ends in 
other than double zero it will read the instructions prior to the branch location and discard 
the unnecessary instructions [Ref. 10]. 
(2) Instruction Dispatch. The instruction dispatch phase of the 
pipeline consists of two stages: the instruction dispatch and instruction decode. When a 
program is compiled, the program is broken into execution packets. An execution packet 
is a set of instructions that can be executed in parallel. To distinguish instructions that 
can be executed in parallel, a "1" will be placed in the last digit of the instruction, and up 
to eight instructions can be executed at once. Instruction dispatch is responsible for 
assigning an instruction to an execution unit. Again, the unit to be used is predetermined 
at compile time [Ref. 10]. 
(3) Execution. The execution phase can range from one to ten 
clock cycles, depending on what type of instruction is being executed. Parallel 
instructions entering the execution stage of the pipeline may complete at different clock 
cycles. Due to the different number of cycles for each instruction, there are no pipeline 
interlocks, and therefore any interdependencies must be taken care of at compile time 
[Ref. 10]. 
b.   Register File 
The general-purpose register file is broken into two groups, each with 16 
32-bit registers. Group A registers service the A data path and B registers service the B 
data path. The '6701 general-purpose register files support data ranging in size from 
packed 16-bit data through 40-bit fixed-point and 64-bit floating-point data. Values 
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larger than 32 bits, such as 40-bit long and 64-bit float quantities, are stored in register 
pairs. In these the 32 LSBs of data are placed in an even-numbered register and the 
remaining 8 or 32 MSBs in the next upper register (which is always an odd-numbered 
register) [Ref. 10]. 
c.   Functional Units 
The eight functional units in the '6701 data paths can be divided into two 
groups of four; each functional unit in one data path is almost identical to the 
corresponding unit in the other data path. The functional units are described in Table 3 
[Ref. 10]. 
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Functional Unit Fixed-Point Operations Floating-Point Operations 
.L unit (.LI, 
.L2) 
32/40-bit arithmetic and compare operations 
32-bit logical operations 
Leftmost 1 or 0 counting for 32 bits 
Normalization count for 32 and 40 bits 
Byte shifts 
Data packing/unpacking 
5-bit constant generation 
Dual 16-bit arithmetic operations 
Quad 8-bit arithmetic.operations 
Dual 16-bit min/max operations 
Quad 8-bit min/max operations  
Arithmetic operations 
DP SP, INT DP, INT SP 
conversion operations 
Sunit(.Sl,.S2) 32-bit arithmetic operations 
32/40-bit shifts and 32-bit bit-field operations 
32-bit logical operations 
Branches 
Constant generation 
Register transfers to/from control file (.S2 only) 
Byte shifts 
Data packing/unpacking 
Dual 16-bit compare operations 
Quad 8-bit compare operations 
Dual 16-bit shift operations 
Dual 16-bit saturated arithmetic operations 
Quad 8-bit saturated arithmetic operations 
Compare 
SP DP conversion operations 
Absolute value operations 
Reciprocal and reciprocal square- 
operations 
Munit(.M1,.M2) 16x16 multiply operations 
16 x 32 multiply operations 
Quad 8x8 multiply operations 
Dual 16x16 multiply with 
add/subtract operations 
Quad 8x8 multiply with add operation 
Bit expansion 
Bit interleaving/de-interleaving 
Variable shift operations 
Rotation 
Galois Field Multiply  
Dunit(.D1, 
D2) 
32-bit add, subtract, linear and circular 
address calculation 
Loads and stores with 5-bit constant offset 
Loads and stores with 15-bit constant offset (.D2 only) 
Load and store double words with 5-constant 
Load and store double and non-aligned words 
5-bit constant generation 
32-bit logical operations 
32 X 32-bit fixed point multiply 
operations 
Floating-point multiply operations 
Load doubleword with 5-bit offset 
Table 3. Function Units [From: Ref. 10]. 
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2.   Internal Program Control and Memory 
The program memory controller, shown in Figure 2, provides the following 
functions: CPU and DMA requests to internal program memory and the required 
arbitration; CPU requests to external memory through the external memory interface 
(EMIF); and manages the internal program memory when it is configured as cache. The 
program memory/cache contains 64K bytes of RAM or, equivalently, 2K 256-bit fetch 
packets. The CPU, through the program memory controller, has a single-cycle throughput 
of 256-bit-wide connection to internal program memory. The memory/cache can be 
operated in four different modes, which are described in the paragraphs below. 
a. Mapped Mode 
In mapped mode, the program fetches from the internal program-memory- 
addresses and returns the fetch packet from that address. In the other modes, CPU 
accesses to this address range return undefined data. Mapped mode is the default state of 
the internal program memory at reset. The CPU cannot access internal program memory 
through the data memory controller [Ref. 10]. 
b. Cache Enabled 
In cache-enabled mode, the first program fetch at an address causes a 
cache miss. In a cache miss, the fetch packet is loaded from the external memory interface 
(EMIF) and stored in the internal cache memory, one 32-bit instruction at a time. While 
the fetch packet is being loaded, the CPU is halted. Any subsequent read from a cached 
address causes a cache hit, and that fetch packet is sent to the CPU from the internal 
program memory without any wait states. Changing from mapped mode to cache enabled 
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mode flushes the program cache. This mode transition is the only means of invalidating 
the cache [Ref. 10]. 
c. Cache Freeze 
During a cache freeze, the cache retains its current state. A program read 
of a frozen cache is identical to a read of an enabled cache except that on a cache miss the 
data read from the external memory interface is not stored in the cache. Cache freeze 
ensures that critical program instructions are not overwritten in the cache [Ref. 10]. 
d. Cache Bypass 
When the cache is bypassed, any program read fetches data from external 
memory. The program instructions are not stored in the cache memory [Ref. 10]. 
3.   Data Memory Controller and Memory 
As shown in Figure 2, the data memory controller connects the CPU and the direct 
memory access (DMA) controller to the internal data memory and performs the necessary 
arbitration; the DMA connects the CPU to the External Memory Interface Controller 
(EMIF) and to the on-chip peripherals through the peripheral bus controller. The data 
memory is 64K bytes on-chip memory to store data for quick access by the CPU. There 
are no wait states incurred when accessing it. It cannot be operated in a cache mode. It 
functions strictly like any other memory. The on-chip memory is organized into two 
blocks of 32K bytes. The DMA and CPU can access on-chip memory simultaneously as 
long as they access different blocks of memory [Ref. 10]. 
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4. Direct Memory Access (DMA) Controller 
The direct memory access (DMA) controller transfers data between regions in the 
memory map without the intervention of the CPU. The DMA controller allows movement 
of data to and from internal memory, internal peripherals, or external devices to occur in 
the background of CPU operation. The DMA controller has four independent 
programmable channels, allowing four different contexts for DMA operation. In addition, 
a fifth (auxiliary) channel allows the DMA controller to service requests from the host 
port interface (HPI). It is important to note that the DMA can operate independently of 
the CPU once it has been setup. For example, the DMA can move blocks of data from a 
first-in-first-out (FIFO) initiated by an internal or external interrupt to internal or external 
memory and then reset once the data transfer is complete, all without the intervention of 
the CPU [Ref. 10]. 
5. Peripheral Bus Controller 
The peripherals are controlled by the CPU and the DMA controller through 
accesses of control registers. The CPU and the DMA controller access these registers 
through the peripheral data bus. The DMA controller directly accesses the peripheral bus 
controller, whereas the CPU accesses it through the data memory controller [Ref. 10]. 
6. Timers 
The device has two 32-bit general-purpose timers that can be used to: 
• Time events 
• Count events 
• Generate pulses 
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• Interrupt the CPU 
• Send synchronization events to the DMA 
The timers have two signaling modes and can be clocked by an internal or an 
external source. The timers have an input pin and an output pin. The input and output 
pins, (TINP and TOUT) can function as timer clock input and clock output. They can 
also be configured for general-purpose input and output, respectively [Ref. 10]. 
7.   Interrupt Selector 
The '6701 peripheral set has up to 32 interrupt sources. The CPU however has 
only 12 interrupts available for its use. The interrupt selector allows the designer to 
choose and prioritize which 12 of the 32 the system needs to use. The interrupt selector 
also allows one to effectively change the polarity of external interrupt inputs. Table 4 
includes a list of possible interrupt source that can be used to halt the processor [Ref. 10]. 
Interrupt Interrupt Acronym Acronym Interrupt Description 
Selection Number 
00000b DSPINT Host processor to DSP interrupt 
00001b TINT0 Timer 0 interrupt 
00010b TINT1 Timer 1 interrupt 
00011b SDJNT EMIF SDRAM timer interrupt 
00100b EXTJNT4 External interrupt pin 4 
00101b EXTJNT5 External interrupt pin 5 
00110b EXTJNT6 External interrupt pin 6 
00111b EXTJNT7 External interrupt pin 7 
01000b DMAJNT0 DMA channel 0 interrupt 
01001b DMAJNT1 DMA channel 1 interrupt 
01010b DMAJNT2 DMA channel 2 interrupt 
01011b DMAJNT3 DMA channel 3 interrupt 
01100b XINT0 McBSP 0 transmit interrupt 
01101b RINT0 McBSP 0 receive interrupt 
01110b XINT1 McBSP 1 transmit interrupt 
01111b RINT1 McBSP 1 receive interrupt 
10000b Reserved 
10001b XINT2 McBSP 2 transmit interrupt 
10010b RINT2 McBSP 2 receive interrupt 
other Reserved 
Table 4. Interrupt Selection [From: Ref. 10]. 
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8.   Multi-Channel Buffer Serial Ports (McBSP) 
The McBSP is based on the standard serial port interface devices. The McBSP 
provides: 
• Full-duplex communication 
• Double-buffered data registers, which allow a continuous data stream 
• Independent framing and clocking for receive and transmit 
• Direct interface to industry-standard codecs, analog interface chips and 
other serially connected A/D and D/A devices 
• External shift clock or an internal, programmable frequency shift clock for 
data transfer 
• Auto-buffering capability through the 5-channel DMA controller 
The McBSP consists of a data path and a control path, which connect to external 
devices. Data is communicated to these external devices via separate pins for 
transmission and reception. Control information (clocking and frame synchronization) is 
communicated via four other pins. The device communicates to the McBSP via 32-bit- 
wide control registers accessible via the internal peripheral bus [Ref. 10]. 
9.   External Memory Interface Controller (EMIF) 
The EMIF controls the entire external memory interface and the rest of the '6701 
including: the DMA controller, data memory controller, program memory controller, and 
the internal peripheral bus. The EMIF allows for glueless interface to external memory. 
The EMIF is controlled by a set of registers that are set during the booting up. These 
registers allow for maximum flexibility in selecting memory types and manufacturers 
[Ref. 10]. 
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10. Host Port Interface (HPI) 
The HPI allows for the DSP to be controlled by an external microprocessor. The 
'6701 allows the external processor full read/write access to its memory map. The HPI is 
a 16-bit wide interface that minimizes the bus width to minimize pinout. The HPI allow 
32-bit data to be multiplexed over the 16-bit bus [Ref. 10]. 
I.        SUMMARY 
After completing a review of the processors the TMS320C6701 was selected as 
the choice for the fault tolerant design. The '6701 still requires testing in a radiation 
environment to ensure its reliability in regard to SEL, SEB and TEX The general 
architecture of the processor was discussed. 
In the next chapter, some of the concepts of triple modular redundancy, a 
hardware technique, are covered. 
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III. DETECTION AND CORRECTION OF SEU 
A.       OVERVIEW 
As discussed in previous chapters, this thesis is concerned with SEU on the '6701 
and not with the effects of TTD, SEL and SEB. Those effects are generally destructive 
and cannot be corrected with hardware or software redundancy. They are only prevented 
by different design considerations and/or manufacturing techniques. So, it is evident that 
only bit flip (changing a binary to its opposite) or transient effects of SEU can be 
corrected with either software and/or hardware redundancy. In simplistic terms, the bit 
flip causes a change in the value of an instruction within the register, resulting in a flawed 
instruction being executed. The execution unit performs according to its instruction, but 
the instruction is wrong. In transient SEU, a correct instruction is given to the execution 
element, but this instruction or its data elements are corrupted by stray energy (a SEU 
event) within the execution element. This results in bad output, even though correct 
instruction and data elements were delivered. There is no functional way to discriminate 
between these two upsets, so for simplicity, they are addressed as one in the same. 
Because of the architecture of the '6701, it is necessary to take a detailed look at how an 
SEU might affect the chip's operation. In order to simplify the problem, transient effects 
during calculations will be grouped together with errors in registers. By studying the 
effects of SEU, we can perform detection, analysis, and correction of corrupted registers 
or transient SEU. 
There are many ways to design a computing system so that it achieves some 
degree of fault tolerance when dealing with SEU. Fault tolerant computing systems 
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employ combinations of hardware, software, time or information redundancy. Each has 
its strengths and weaknesses, but each can be categorized in one of two groups: time 
redundant or hardware redundant. Since there are radiation hardened DSP in the market 
already, it is necessary that the design proposed here remains as fast possible in order to 
justify choosing a non-radiation hardened processor. Therefore, this design will use triple 
modular redundancy (TMR) hardware to achieve fault tolerant design. The overall goal is 
to exploit all of the advances in the '6701 with minimum constraints on future design 
implementations. This overall goal includes the ability to use any memory type, the two 
serial ports, and control the '6701 by any external host. 
B.        TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANCY (TMR) 
A common and simple idea for hardware redundancy is triple modular redundancy 
(TMR). Basically, triplicating the processing hardware allows the system to execute 
instructions in parallel and then majority vote the outputs to provide a correct system 








Figure 4. Basic TMR Circuit Implementation [From: Ref. 2]. 
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Fundamentally in the TMR system, if one module becomes faulty, the other two 
modules mask the error of the faulty module through a majority vote. 
In a TMR system with three digital signal processors, the most hazardous type of 
error is when an SEU causes one DSP to branch to an unexpected location. This causes 
the system to go out of synchronization. The affected processor will continue to operate 
out of sync with the other two processors until all three processors are reset to the same 
location in the execution cycle. Until the faulty unit is reset, the system is no longer TMR 
system. It becomes a dual processor system that can detect errors but cannot correct 
errors. Since this is a fault tolerant design, this is an unacceptable state of operation. 
One of the primary disadvantages of a TMR system is that it is no more reliable 
than the voter. The voter is now a single point of failure and is the weakest link in the 
chain. A solution to this process would be to triplicate the voter also, but how would one 
select the system output among the three outputs? You could then vote the outputs of the 
three voters but then second level voter becomes the single point of failure. Since 
triplicated voters still require a final vote to be made by one voter, this idea is discarded 
because it just adds another layer of logic delay and more power. Since there is no 
practical advantage for the redundancy described above, a single stage TMR system is 
selected for this project. This then poses extra reliability requirements for the voter. 
1.   Voting Techniques 
There are several ways a TMR system can be designed. It can be designed with 
three completely independent systems, which then vote their outputs. Each system 
contains its own sensors and digital signal processor, which calculate their output. This 
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output is then sent to a voter. Using this design presents a problem though. Is the 
processor at fault or is there a slight difference of quantization by the analog to digital 
converters? The slight difference in quantization would masquerade as an error, when in 
fact there is little difference among the processors' results. 
A second design might use three processors working in parallel that have the same 
inputs and then vote the results. This technique ensures each processor is working with 
the same data. They should all output identical results. Of course, this is another point at 
which a single point failure could cripple the system. Since it is nearly impossible to 
build identical analog to digital converters, a single input shall drive all three processors 
to ensure that each is starting with the identical data. The three processors should then 
result in three identical outputs. The output will then be voted upon to determine if an 
error has occurred. 
The process of voting digital data itself is rather simple. The three outputs from 
the DSP are used to find a majority. The same process can also be used to detect when an 
error occurs. Figure 5 shows how error detection and error correction can occur 
simultaneously. The three AND gates and one OR gate correct for errors while the AND, 










Figure 5. Majority-Voter and Error Detection. 
2.   Voting Issues 
Voting timing becomes a major issue when designing with a microprocessor and 
its outputs. Since the voting is performed on all outputs, a careful timing analysis must 
be performed to answer the following questions: when do you vote? What impact does it 
have on the memory cycle? What impact does it have on bi-directional busses? Can the 
three processors be synchronized? How do you stop the processors once an error has 
occurred? How do you find identical errors? 
The answers to these questions are dependent upon the type of microprocessor 
selected. Since I have already selected the '6701,1 will answer these questions as they 
pertain only to the '6701. 
First let us examine the CE, BE, data and address busses to determine when we 
could vote the busses and how voting affects the memory bus cycle. Different memory 
types affect how the memory bus is operated. The memory types must be individually 
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analyzed due to their unique operation of the memory bus. In the following sections, each 
memory type will be analyzed. 
a.  Asynchronous Peripheral 
In order to assure proper timing, a review of the memory cycle is 
necessary. Asynchronous peripherals is a term that refers to a vast spectrum of memory 
types including such familiar types as asynchronous random access memory (ASRAM), 
flash memory, read only memory (ROM), first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffers, dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM) and many more peripheral devices. The unique glueless 
interface of the '6701 allows for a single type of memory to occupy an entire CE memory 
space without any extra logic to generate chip-select. Since there are only four CE 
memory spaces, the asynchronous peripherals are usually grouped together in one 
memory space. Therefore, external logic devices are required to generate chip-select 
signal, if more than one type of memory is located within one CE space. An internal 
control register, which is initialized during the boot cycle, controls each CE space (Figure 
6). When the CE control register is set for an asynchronous memory type (putting the 
appropriate code in the Mtype field), it allows for manipulation of the timing of the read 
and write cycles. 
EMIF CE(0/1/2/3) Space Control Register  
31 28 27 
Write Setup 
22 21 20 19 
Write Strobe 
16 
Write Hold | Read Setup 
15          14 13                                               8 7 6                 4 3              2 1               0 
Rsvd Read Strobe Rsvd Mtype Rsvd Read Hold 
Figure 6. EMIF Control Regi ster [From: Rel 111]. 
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By setting the CE fields that control write-setup, write-strobe and write-hold, the 
'6701 inserts the required number of wait-states. In the '6701, the ability exists to operate 
seamlessly with external memory devices. This feature does not need the normal 
acknowledgment signal from the memory device to the CPU to indicate that it is ready for 
a write. By eliminating the acknowledgment signal, the memory cycle is sped up. The 
same is also true for the read cycle. This feature can be exploited by inserting a required 
amount of time in order to perform the voting of data and address busses. 
Satup       i     Sätn=>*M3      I       HoldcdwMte 
-1 »4>—i —»4- 1 - 
Figure 7. Asynchronous Write Cycle [From: Ref. 13]. 
From the write cycle (Figure 7), it is observed that address, CE, BE and data are 
all asserted at the same time. The logical place to insert the required wait states is in the 
setup time. Because the data bus is a bi-directional bus, there is a need to ensure that no 
stray signals are generated. This implies a need for a tri-state device. Tri-state devices 
require a control signal in order to be activated. For the write cycle, the write strobe 
could be used to control the flow of data to memory. 
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Figure 8. Asynchronous Read Cycle [From: Ref. 13]. 
From the read cycle (Figure 8), it is observed that address, CE, BE and data are all 
asserted at the same time. Again, the flow of data must be controlled. The '/ARE' signal 
could be used as the control signal. 
For both the read and write cycles, the address, BE, and CE signals can be voted 
upon without the need for a control signal to regulate the flow to memory. By allowing 
the signals to propagate through the voting circuit without a control signal, the memory 
maybe operated at a higher speed. But generating an error signal to interrupt the 
processor requires that the /ARE and the /AWE signals are used to control exactly when 
the error generator is sampled. The use of these two signals ensures a sufficient amount 
of settlement time passes before the vote is sampled. This also allows for a small amount 
of skew between the processors without detriment. 
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b.   Synchronous Burst Random Access Memory (SBRAM) 
Like the asynchronous memory types, a detailed look at the read/write 
cycle is needed to ensure the proper operation of the bi-directional data bus. Synchronous 
Burst Random Access Memory (SBRAM) is normally ideal for DSP because of its high- 
speed operation, which allows for rapid transfer of data to and from memory. Unlike the 
asynchronous memory, the CE memory space control has a more limited amount of 
control over the memory cycle. Operation at full CPU clock speed or half CPU clock 
speed is the only control over SBSRAM. Because both the timer and external interrupt 
inputs require a minimum hold time of two clock cycles, SBSRAM can only be operated 
at half CPU clock speed. This memory type may not be used in the final application, but 
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Figure 9. SBSRAM Write cycle [From: Ref. 14]. 
The SBSRAM write cycle, shown in Figure 9, has an initial two-memory 
clock-cycle delay setup time before the first write occurs. A maximum burst length of 
four write locations can be performed during any burst cycle. Like asynchronous 
memory, the write strobe (SSWE) can be used to control the flow of data on the data bus 
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from the CPU to the SBSRAM. There is no need to worry about triggering the voting 
error signal for each address location and data set, because the external interrupt and 
timing register require a minimum hold of 2 internal clock cycles. Therefore, a small 
perturbation, caused by slight clock skew between processors or transitions of 
address/data lines, will not cause false positives. 
Figure 10. SBRAM Read Cycle [From: Ref. 14]. 
The SBSRAM read cycle, shown in Figure 10, also has an initial two 
memory-cycles before the first read is latched into the CPU. The SSOE signal can be 
used to control the data bus flow from memory to the CPU. Like the write cycle, any 
minor perturbations in voting of address lines will be ignored by the CPU due to the 
minimum of two CPU clock-cycle hold times. 
The CE, BE and address lines can be handled the same as the 
asynchronous memory types. The most significant factor in using SBRAM in this design 
will be the absolute speed of the voting circuit. The entire memory cycle cannot exceed 
two internal clock-cycles (operating at the slowest speed of 133 MHz), which is a 
maximum of 15 nsec. In order to achieve these results, the read (SSOE) and write 
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(SSWE) will only be voted upon and will not factor into the generation of the error signal 
to interrupt the CPU. 
c.   Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory (SDRAM) 
Like SBSRAM, Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory 
(SDRAM) is ideal for DSP because of its high-speed access times. SDRAM also would 
have the added benefit of lower power requirements. As with the other two memory 
types the data bus must maintain a tri-state functionality. Figure 11 and 12 show the 
memory cycle for SDRAM type memory architecture. The problem revealed by the two 
timing diagrams is that there is no signal that can be used to indicate a read cycle is taking 
place and that the bypass buffer should be turned on. One could use the negative of the 
write cycle (/SDWE), but it then would be turned on all the time regardless whether a 
read cycle is occurring or not. This would be a suitable solution as long as no other types 
of memory share a common data bus, but to keep the design simple and to avoid building 
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Figure 11. '6701 SDRAM Read Clock Cycle [From: Ref. 16]. 
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Figure 12. '6701 SDRAM Read Cycle [From: Ref. 16]. 
d.   Miscellaneous Timing Issues 
Processor synchronization depends upon each CPU having nearly identical 
clock input signals and each processor being reset at the same time. The use of a single 
clock generator for all three processors is important. The frequency of the clock input to 
the CPUs is one half the internal clock rate. 
There is an additional point of concern that is not necessarily central to the 
thesis, but deserves mentioning. Identical errors will not be detectable by this hardware 
implementation, but it is highly unlikely that identical errors across 19 address lines, 4 BE 
lines, 4 CE lines and 32 data lines would occur. There are three scenarios that can be 
described: error in one processor, and identical errors in two processors, and non-identical 
errors in two or more processors. The first case, a unique error in one processor, is both 
detectable and recoverable and is the focus of this work. The second case, identical errors 
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in two processors, is not detectable and not recoverable. The third scenario, non-identical 
errors in two or more processors, is detectable and correctable. 
The outputs from the HPI are not voted upon, because the HPI will be used 
to extract information from the processors to determine where the error occurred. When 
an error signal occurs, the processors will go into an interrupt service routine that will 
save all registers to internal memory. This will preserve the fault and allow an external- 
host processor to read the internal memory of each processor, so that it may be 
determined which was at fault and which register was corrupted. After saving the 
registers internally, the processors write all the registers through the voter to an external 
memory location. By writing to the external memory, the processor in fault will be 
masked out by the other two. The corrected data can then be read back into the 
appropriate registers and the CPUs can resume their functions. This re-synchronizes the 
CPUs. 
C.       ANALYSIS OF SEU ON TMS320C6701 
As discussed in the previous section, the TMR design can detect only when an 
error is written to an external device or an unexpected read or write occurs. In this 
section, each sub-section of the '6701 will be examined in detail, specifically for the 
affects of radiation induced SEU. It must be determined if an SEU can be detected and 
how it will affect the processor. It is assumed that any transient effects caused during 
calculations will appear to be the same as if the original register(s) being operated upon 
was (were) corrupted. In other words, it may look corrupted, when it is actually not 
corrupted. 
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1. Error in Program RAM or Cache 
If a bit-flip occurs in the program RAM or cache, an error may be detected in the 
data or address busses. Pin pointing this error will be unlikely, unless program memory is 
operated in memory-mapped mode. It can be corrected in an interrupt handling routine 
that changes program memory from operating in cache-mode to memory-mapped mode 
and then back to cache. This will flush the cache and each processor will reload its cache. 
2. Error in Internal Data Memory 
An error in the data memory will only be detected when a vote-error is detected on 
the data bus. Since internal memory is used for storage of constants that are used in 
FFTs, FIR filters and HR filters, it becomes critical that these values are not corrupted. 
This is a very important issue if numerous results are stored to internal memory before a 
result is exported to an external device/memory. A solution to this problem is to 
periodically update the constants using one of the DMA channels. By using a DMA 
channel, minimum impact on the processor throughput can be maintained while 
improving the reliability. 
3. SEU Error Induced into Registers 
The registers of a CPU are critical to its correct performance. If these registers 
become corrupted by an SEU, it is necessary to determine what the repercussions of the 
corrupted register might be and how a faulty register is detected. Appendix A takes a 
detailed look at all of the control registers of the '6701. There are four main categories, 
into which all errors fall: detectable address errors, detectable data errors, undetectable 
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errors and undefined errors. The detectable address and data errors can easily be dealt 
with by the TMR design. Undetectable errors present a challenge to this process. These 
undetectable errors occur when reading/writing to internal memory. Most of the 
undetectable errors will be eventually detected. The detection will occur during writing 
data to external devices. The classification of undefined errors is exclusively reserved for 
SEU occurring in reserved fields in control registers. Without detailed documentation 
from Texas Instruments, it is impossible to determine how the '6701 will behave when a 
reserve field is corrupted. 
D.       SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DSP 
Due to the nature of signal processing, data errors are not as important as data 
errors in other digital processing systems (i.e. general-purpose microprocessors). DSP is 
an approximation of the real world events using FIR filters, ER filters and other types of 
signal processing techniques to reconstruct or model the original signal. In addition, 
nearly all digitally processed signals will be converted back to the analog world. 
Therefore, stray perturbations will be smoothed out. 
For example, if a sound signal is digital processed and recorded that has a few 
"spikes of high frequency interference" introduced by the recording process, when the 
recorded signal is played back, the amplifier-speaker system can only respond so quickly 
(the system acts like a low-pass filter). The high frequency interference will be attenuated 
by the system response characteristics. Therefore, even large errors will be minimized 
making data errors in DSP less important than data errors in general purpose processors. 
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1.   Address Errors 
Data and address errors are not unique to DSP; they happen to all non-radhard 
devices in a space environment. A more pressing issue is how to handle DSP address 
errors. They must be handled in the same way as any other microprocessor. 
Address errors may branch to an undefined location in memory. They could 
branch to the middle of a sub-program. In any case, it is unexpected and will quickly 
result in system failure. Due to this system criticality, address errors must be handled 
immediately by system. This is accomplished when the voter generates an interrupt 
signal to the CPU. Then, the interrupt routine can effectively handle the error. This 
interrupt handling routine is discussed in Chapter IV. 
2.   Data Errors 
Data errors can be handled differently because of the nature of DSP, as we 
discovered in the preceding paragraphs. Sometimes an error occurs early in the processor 
history and remains undiscovered until much later in the process. By then, it would be 
pointless to interrupt the processors. For example, while performing an FFT, internal data 
memory is often used to store intermediate values to speed the calculations. An error 
could be present there. This error would then carry all the way through to the final FFT 
output. Suppose that you have 32-bits per point and 1024 points and you want to perform 
an FFT. It requires approximately 40,000 operations; all of which is done to output 1024 
32-bit words. A few of these words at the end could have errors, but to halt the processor 
at this time would be inefficient, and since DSP usually convert the end product into 
analog anyway, these errors become overtaken by events. 
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An important, overall assumption to this thesis has three component assumptions. 
The first is that SEUs occur infrequently in the '6701, even in a space environment. The 
second is that the voting process masks out all single processor failures. The third 
component assumption is that coincidental processor failures are very infrequent. Based 
on the previous paragraphs, therefore, it becomes apparent why data errors are treated 
differently than address errors. 
The data voter will generate pulses to be counted by each processor. An interrupt 
will occur when there are an excessive number of data errors. By counting the errors and 
interrupting the processor when excessive number of data errors occurs, the probability of 
multiple processors being in error at once is limited. What constitutes an excessive 
number of errors is left for latter work. 
3.   Variable Pipe Length 
Another reason to service address errors immediately, beyond the fact that 
branching to undefined locations is undesirable, is the variable pipeline length. By not 
allowing address errors to persist, the chance for a processor branching to an undefined 
location can be minimized. A type of undetectable error occurs when instructions write 
results to internal memory locations. These errors will only be detected once they are 
written to external memory location. Therefore, programs using internal memory 
locations should periodically scrub the internal data memory. Good computer science 
dictates that internal data memory should only be used for intermediate calculations. 
Anything that requires long-term storage should be stored off chip. This ensures 
agreement between processors and provides for better system reliability. 
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E.        SUMMARY 
In summary, Chapter III looked at some of the affects of radiation on the '6701 
and how to deal with SEU. A TMR design was proposed as a way to deal with SEU. The 
implementation of '6701 TMR design was also examined. Alternative schemes were 
discussed for the handling of address and data errors, as well as the implications of when, 
how and to what extent to mitigate them. This chapter leads naturally to a discussion of 
specific implementation issues. Chapter IV will deal with specific implementation of the 
'6701 in a TMR design. 
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IV. TMRTESTBED DESIGN 
A.       OVERVIEW 
In order to observe the performance and behavior of a digital signal processor in 
the presents of radiation induced SEUs, the address, data and control busses must be 
monitored. In a digital signal processor, there is not an efficient built-in mechanism to 
indicate to external devices and/or observers that an SEU induced error have occurred. 
SEU induced errors may cause the processor to "lock up" or "crash," which is detectable, 
but is of little use when trying to trouble-shoot or monitor the performance of the system 
[Ref. 2]. 
Monitoring of the address and data busses presents another problem. Without a 
separate entity which is deemed, or assumed, to be error free there is not a way to tell if 
the information that appears on the busses is error free or not. In addition, in the presence 
of radiation induced SEUs, the ability to correct such faults once detected are a necessary 
characteristic. 
In this testbed design, triple modular redundancy (TMR) was chosen to allow 
monitoring of three identical processors running identical programs. The majority voting 
used in conjunction with TMR provides detection of an SEU that has been manifested as 
a disagreement among the address, data, and control busses of the three digital signal 
processors. The majority voter also allows the masking and thus correction of these SEU 
induced disagreements. The address, data, and control bus information from the two 
digital signal processors that agree is used to start, control, and complete each bus cycle. 
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As explained in Chapter HI, this argument assumes that identical faults, or errors, 
will not occur in two different microprocessors and produce the same erroneous results 
on their associated busses. If this should occur, then the majority would be in an error 
state and we propose that this is unlikely. 
B.       TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANT DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSOR 
Having reviewed the concept of TMR, what follows is a description on how they 
might be employed with three digital signal processors. Building the testbed using the 
TFM TMS320C6701 floating-point digital signal makes it useful to examine what is 
necessary in constructing a board with three '6701 's operating in a TMR design. 
A/D 
Converter 
Figure 13. Simple *6701 Board Design. 
Figure 13 is a simple non-specific digital signal processing board design. The 
final design, to be used by an application, will need to incorporate the overall 
requirements of a DSP system to determine what components are necessary. For 
example, the FIFO in Figure 13 is used to import data from an analog-to-digital (A/D) 
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converter. However, many applications have a serial bus interface, which would require 
elimination of the FIFO and the use of a multi-channel serial bus interface (McBSP). In 
addition to parallel/serial bus interface, the type of DSP processing application directly 
affects the memory types and memory space required to perform image processing in 
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Figure 14. TMR '6701 Board Design. 
Expanding on this simple system, Figure 14 shows a block diagram of a TMR 
system using '6701 digital-signal-processor. Figure 14 also shows the additional 
hardware blocks necessary to implement majority voting of the address, data, and CE 
busses. 
A significant issue when using three processors in a TMR design is the 
synchronization of the processors. The processors will have one clock generator input 
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that will drive all three '6701 's. As discussed in Chapter El, the address bus and CE 
signals will be voted with simple logic devices and will not be clocked. This design will 
act as a propagation delay only, but to ensure the address and CE voters do not generate 
false error signals, a control buffer is placed at the end of the error generation circuit. The 
control signal will be a combination of the read/write strobes. The strobes come 
sufficiently late in the read/write cycle to allow for slight clock skew between processors. 
The voted address and CE signals do not have control buffers to impede flow of address 
and CE signals to external memory locations. A detailed look at this design will be 
presented in following sections. 
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Figure 15. Interrupt Buffer Control Circuit. 
The data bus synchronization requires more design considerations. Since the data 
bus is a tri-state bus and the voting is only occurring in one direction, care must be taken 
to ensure proper bus operation. The tri-state design must be maintained to ensure only 
one driver is driving the bus. Introducing the voter creates the possibility of multiple 
devices driving the bus. Therefore, a buffer must be placed at the end of voting circuit 
and a buffer must be placed in the bypass path, bypassing the voter, for data to travel from 
the memory to the processor. As in the case of the address voter, the read and write 
strobes can be used to control these buffers. In addition, a buffer to allow a skew margin 
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between processors will control the error signal generated by the data voter. A detailed 
look at this design will be presented in following sections. 
1.   Testbed Operation Summary 
The testbed contains three TFM TMS320C6701 digital signal processors, 
operating at 120 MHz, executing the same program and service routine. Each will use 
internal SRAM memory to capture critical control-registers, address and data bus 
information during an interrupt handling routine. There is one PCI-to-HPI bridge to 
control the digital signal processor. The host microprocessor, on the other side of the 
PCI-to-HPI Bridge, is responsible for writing the execution program instructions into the 
memory map of the three digital signal processors. The host processor will also be used 
to extract the fault data during interrupts by reading each digital signal processor's 
internal memory. The host processor will access each '6701 independently to determine 
which processor is affected by an SEU event. All of this is accomplished by using the 
feature of a HPI. The '6701 is designed for an external processor to have control over the 
entire memory map of the '6701. The data traveling over the HPI bus will not be voted. 
The address busses, data busses and control signals will be majority voted and 
combine the outputs from the three processors. These voted busses are then used to 
access the same SRAM, SBRAM and FIFO. The FIFO will be used as a parallel bus 
interface between the digital signal processors and an analog-to-digital (A/D) converter. 
Excluding the A/D converter will allow for follow-on designers to choose the type of A/D 
converter that is best suited for their application. 
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Address and data errors will be handled separately. Address errors will generate 
an interrupt signal to each processor. Then each digital signal processor will enter 
identical interrupt handling routine. Data errors will generate a signal pulse that will be 
sent to each processor's internal timer where it will be counted. The internal timer is a 
32-bit register that can count from 0 to 232-l. It also can be used as a down counter and 
can be set to interrupt at any desired number of pulsing events. The reason for handling 
for data and address errors separately has already been discussed in Chapter HI. 
The following sections will discuss normal operations, error detection, error 
prevention, and error correction. Each will look at how they impact the systems 
operation. 
a.   Normal (Error free) Operations 
At the beginning of a bus cycle (read or write), the address, BE and CE 
control signals are voted. The two levels of logic required to majority vote will only 
delay the address, BE and CE signals from arriving at the memory location. This delay 
can be incorporated into the setup time required by the memory. 
The data bus must be maintained slightly differently than the address bus. 
Because the data bus is a tri-state bus, a control signal must be used to ensure there is 
only one driver driving the bus. Therefore, at the conclusion of the majority voting a 
control buffer is placed to ensure forward direct (write) control. A bypass buffer, 
bypassing the voter circuit, is placed in the flow of data from memory to the processors. 
The write and read strobes will be used to control flow of data. 
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The write and read strobes will be voted upon, but they will not be used in 
generating error signals to the processors. Since the likelihood of identical errors is 
considered small, it will be assumed that the chance of two processors generating 
identical read/write strobe errors is very small. 
b.   Error Detection 
The error detection circuit has a minimum of three levels of logic, but 
since it requires "ORing" either 32 error signals (data bus), or 27 error signals (address 
bus, BE and CE signals) it also requires several levels of logic. Although the voting 
circuit in a programmable logic device, it was assumed that it could be done with four 
levels of logic, two layers of logic for each bit to generate an error signal then followed by 
4 8-bit OR gates followed by one 4-bit OR gate to generate the final interrupt or error 
pulse signals. The final error signals will require a control buffer to prevent slight 
variations in arrival times from generating errors. 
Address errors will cause an interrupt signal to the processor. The current 
bus cycle will be completed and then the processors will halt and start an interrupt 
handling routine. The error will be masked by the voter during read and write operations 
through the majority voter. 
Data errors will cause an error pulse to be sent to the timers on each signal 
processor to be counted. When enough data error signals have been generated, the 
processors will enter the same interrupt handling routine as an address error-interrupt 
handler. Using the internal counter provides flexibility to help determine an optimum 
number of errors before an interrupt. The number of errors can be balanced against 
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system accuracy and maintaining a high data throughput. For example, if a processor is 
bogged down doing numerous interrupt-handling routines, it will eventually cause the 
input FIFO to overflow because the processor cannot service the FIFO. The loss of data 
due to the interrupt handler will have the same affect as if a processor had corrupted the 
data. 
c. Error Prevention 
Using the internal data memory to store coefficients required to perform 
FFT, FIR filters and other DSP algorithms is an important assumption in this design. To 
limit the possibility of these coefficients becoming corrupted, they should be periodically 
refreshed. The refreshing routine will have limited impact on the processor's throughput 
because a DMA channel will be used to perform this refresh in the background of the 
signal processor's CPU operations. The same procedures should also be applied to any 
other values that are used repetitively and are stored in internal data memory. This 
implementation will require modification and/or development of special code that can be 
used by the operating system and/or application specific program. 
d. Error Correction 
Upon receipt of an interrupt, either from an address interrupt or timer 
interrupt, each processor executes the same interrupt service routine. The beginning of 
the routine will mask out all other interrupts. The internal general-purpose registers and 
configuration registers are written to a reserved internal data memory location. In 
addition to writing the registers to internal memory, they will also be written to a 
dedicated external memory location. By writing the data to an external memory location, 
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a majority vote can be performed, thus masking out the corrupted data. The processors 
can then read back this information and be reset to a known and corrected state. The 
"faulty" processor will now have been "corrected" and re-synchronized. In addition to 
reading back the corrected registers, coefficients used for algorithms need to be read from 
their external memory locations and rewritten to internal data memory. To ensure the 
program cache is not corrupted, it should be invalidated. The simple procedure of 
switching from cache mode to memory-mapped mode and back to cache mode will 
effectively invalidate the program cache. 
e.   Error Monitoring 
Since error monitoring is an important aspect of this design, an external 
host processor has been added which can be used to perform this error analysis. Since the 
external host processor has full access to the memory map of each processor individually, 
it can then read the internal data memories. The dedicated internal data memory will 
contain the information on where and possibly how the error occurred. 
2.   TI™ TMS320C6701 Simulation 
A model for the complete '6701 digital signal processor is not available for 
simulation of the testbed design. Therefore, in order to develop the concept for this 
design, a detailed analysis was performed on the read/write cycle to ensure proper 
behavior of the memory system. One assumption that was used was the delay incurred 
for the voting logic [Ref. 3 and 6]. From previous design projects, a timing delay of 
seven nanoseconds was used as the delay incurred when generating a voted signal. The 
implemented circuits were placed on a Xilinks™ programmable chip. In addition to the 
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timing requirements for the voting circuit, arbitrary components were also used in the 
design. These assumptions do not undermine the validity of this thesis since it is a 
demonstration project. Specific components were not selected due to the rapidly 
changing component market and the required testing of each component in a radiation 
environment. 
In the description of the blocks and in associated figures, the following convention 
has been used. Signal and bus names which are bold and italicized, such as FORCE_A, 
are intend to match the same signal and bus names in the overall schematic in Appendix 
B. This should make them easy to cross-reference. In addition, bus names that have an 
underscore followed by a letter and then end with a series of numbers, such as 
AD_A<21..2>, represent bus signals that come from each of the three signal processors. 
C. TI™ TMS320C6701 ADDRESS, BE, AND CE BUS INTERFACE 
In this section, we will demonstrate that the address (EA<21:2>), BE, and CE 
busses meet the manufacturers specifications for the '6701. 
The peripheral user's manual for the '6701 digital signal processor [Ref. 10] was 
used in conjunction with the ASRAM and SBSRAM implementation guides [Refs. 12 
and 13]. Generic data sheets were used for the memory, which demonstrates that the 
timing requirements meet manufacturers' specifications. 
1.   Memory Read/Write Cycle 
The read and write cycles were lumped together because there is no difference 
between the two. The CE signal is the most important of the three signals. The CE 
signal is connected to the chip enable pin on memory chips and other peripheral devices. 
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The chip enable signal enables the operation of memory and other peripheral devices. 
Using this knowledge and the fact that the EA and BE busses are unidirectional, a simple 
voting circuit can be directly implemented into the bus architectures. Each line will be 
voted to produce a system output (V_EA<21:2>, V_BE<3:0> and V_CE<3:0>) and 
generate an error signal (EAJERROR). To generate V_EA<21:2>, V_BE<3:0> and 
V_CE<3:0> a majority voter and error generator was used using the inputs from each 
processor corresponding signals. The delay in generating the combined system output 
was treated as a propagation delay that could be easily added into memory timing 
requirement. Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate the abilities to use asynchronous memory 
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Figure 16. Asynchronous SRAM Write Cycle with Voting Delay. 
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I Ons 125ns |50ns |75ns 
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Figure 17. Synchronous Burst SRAM Read Cycle with Voting Delay. 
The following precaution is needed for this circuit to ensure false errors are not 
generated. Placing a pass-gate buffer at the end of the 27-bit input OR gate, that 
generates the EAJERROR, will ensure false positives are not generated. The pass-gate 
also ensures a sufficient amount of time has passed to allow for voter comparison. The 
control signal (ADDVOTERjCONT) for the pass-gate is generated by an OR gate using 
the strobe signals, V_ARE, V_AWE, V_SSOE, and V_SSWE. One of these four signals 
is always present during a read or write cycle. The EAJERROR is then connected to a 
simple non-clock SR latch. The EAJERROR is connected to the S (set latch). The 
output of the SR latch is then connected to each processor's EXTJNT7. The SR latch 
uses the voted IACK for the reset signal (R input). The simple latch was placed into the 
circuit to ensure EAJERROR, which is connected to the EXTJNT7, is held for the 
minimum of two internal-clock pulses for each processor. Once the interrupt handling 
routine commences, the external interrupt is ignored. 
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In summary, the address, BE, and CE busses were easily monitored to ensure no 
errors were generated by SEU events. The simplicity of this circuit was due to the fact 
that these signals were unidirectional 
D.        TI™ TMS320C6701 DATA BUS INTERFACE 
In this section, we will demonstrate that the data bus (ED<31:0>) meets the 
manufacturer's specifications for the '6701. 
The peripheral user's manual for the '6701 digital signal processor [Ref. 10] was 
used in conjunction with the ASRAM and SBSRAM implementation guides [Refs. 14 
and 15]. The memory cycle must be split into read and write portions because the data 
bus is a bi-directional bus. The bi-directional bus must be maintained to allow data to 
flow to and from external peripheral devices.   To allow for data to travel from the 
external memory to each processor, a bypass pass-gate buffer was placed in series 
between the memory and the DSP. This pass-gate buffer is also in parallel with voter 
circuit. Figure 18 represents this simple idea. Using the pass-gate buffers ensures only 
one gate is driving the bus and a race condition will not occur. 
ToflFromMemoiy 
Figure 18. Simple Voter Control and Bypass Circuit. 
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1.   Memory Write Cycle 
To generate V_ED<31:0> a majority voter and error generator was used using the 
inputs from each processor corresponding signals. Unlike the address generating circuit, 
the data voter requires both the output of the majority voter and error detector use a pass- 
gate to control flow. The pass-gate on the output of the error generator is used for the 
same reason as the pass-gate used on the error generator for the address. The pass-gate on 
the output of the majority voter is used to control flow on the data bus. Figures 19 and 20 



















Figure 19. Asynchronous SRAM Write Cycle with Delay of Voting. 
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Figure 20. Synchronous Burst SRAM Write Cycle with Delay of Voting. 
To generate DATA_ERROR a 32-input OR gate, that uses the ERRORSIG from 
each voter bit circuit, was used. A pass-gate buffer is at the output of the 32 input OR 
gate. The pass-gate ensures a sufficient amount of time has passed to allow the circuit to 
settle. The control signal {WRITEJCONT) for the pass-gate was generated by an OR 
gate using the strobe signals V_WE, and VJSSWE. One of these two signals is always 
present during a write cycle. WRITEJCONT was also used to active the pass-gate 
controlling the flow of data to the external memory locations. 
The DATAJERROR connected to a clocked D Flip-Hop. The output of the D 
Flip-Flop is connected to the TINP for each processor. To clock the flip-flop one of the 
SSCLK was used. SSCLK is used because it runs at half the speed of the CPU, this 
provides for a long enough pulse to be recognized by the '6701. The flip-flop was placed 
into the circuit to ensure DATAJERROR, which is connected to the TINP, is held for the 
minimum of two internal-clock pulses for each processor. Each processor will then count 
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the pulses generated by the data error generator. By using the internal counting register, 
this allows the design to be flexible. Since the assumption is made that data errors were 
less important than address errors, it is desired to provide the ability to monitor the 
number data errors. The timer can be easily modified, by modifying the software. This 
will enable follow-on designers to determine the number of errors that can be accepted on 
the data bus before a system interrupt must be executed. 
2. Memory Read Cycle 
The read cycle only requires a means to bypass the voting circuit. This is 
accomplished by placing pass-gate buffers between the shared memory and the DSP. The 
control signal (READjCONT) for the pass-gate was generated by an OR gate using the 
strobe signals, V_ARE, and V_SSOE. One of these two signals is always present during 
a read cycle. READjCONT was also used to active the pass-gate controlling the flow of 
data from the shared memory. 
3. Addition Considerations for the Read/Write Cycle for SBSRAM 
Due to the timing requirement of the SBSRAM cycle, it was determined that the 
SBSRAM must be operated at half of the processors internal clock rate, in other word at 
60 MHz. This was necessary to allow the signals to propagate through the voting circuit. 
As seen from Figures 17 and 20, address and data are placed on the busses during the 
falling edge of the output SSCLK and clock into the memory chip during the rising edge 
of the SSCLK. This provides for enough time for propagation delay due to the voting 
circuit and setup time required by the SBRAM memory type. This provides for a safety 
margin of 6 ns for a write cycle. It was not possible to meet the minimum set time and to 
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allow for propagation delay when the SSCLK was operated at 120 MHz (full internal 
clock speed). Read cycles are much more tolerant since there is no control buffer 
impeding the flow of addresses to the memory unit. In addition, only one of the SSCLKs 
will be used to clock the SBSRAM. 
4.   First-in-First-Out (FIFO) 
The FIFO is providing a simple means of connecting the DSP circuit to an A/D 
converter. It is intend to send an interrupt signal to the processors when the FIFOs are 
half-full. It is located in CE1 memory space. It occupies the entire CE1 memory space, 
but this can be easily modified if one wants to add a few address lines to the FIFO read 
enable circuit. 
E.       TI™ TMS320C6701 HOST PROCESSOR INTERFACE (HPI) 
The HPI is used in accordance with the TMS320C6701 user guide [Ref. 10] and 
the PCI2040 (PCI-HPI bridge) interface implementation guide [Ref. 16]. None of the 
signals for the HPI bus are voted. The HPI interface bus will be used to determine which 
processor was at "fault" once an interrupt is generated. The interrupt handling routine 
will save all general-purpose registers and control registers to the on chip SRAM memory 
for each processor. 
The HPI bus will also be used to load instructions into the memory space of the 
processors. By using HPI bus to load operating instruction, the host processor will 
eliminates the need for "boot up" read-only-memory (ROM). This will be useful to test 
operating systems to control the DSP. 
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F.        IMPACT OF THE TMR SYSTEM 
The TMR system has the following impact upon the use of the '6701. It will slow 
all memory access time by the time required to complete the majority voting process. In 
this case it was assumed to be 7 ns (from previous design projects) [Ref. 3 and 6]. The 7 
ns delay forces the system to operate the SBSRAM at one half the clock rate of the 
processor regardless of how fast the SBSRAM memory may be. The TMR design will 
use one of four external interrupt inputs. It will also use one of the two timers. It will 
also require the modification of an operating system to deal with the external interrupts 
and excessive data errors. A small portion of on-chip and off-chip memory will need to 
be reserved for writing the control registers to memory. The off-chip memory is needed 
for the interrupt service routine to majority vote the processors and re-synchronize the 
processors and the on-chip memory will be need to help determine why/where an SEU 
occurred 
G.       SUMMARY 
This chapter covered the implementation of a TMR system using the TFM 
TMS320C6701. Appendix B provides the wiring schematic and was developed with the 
Cadence™ design tool. The timing analysis was done by hand calculations to ensure that 
all manufacture specifications were met. Further refinement of the system can be made 
once the type of application is determined (i.e. used for radio signal processing or for 
image processing). 
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V.    CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
A.       SUMMARY 
The previous chapter provided the preliminary design for a TMR architecture 
using the TFM TMS320C6701 digital signal processor chip and outlined some of the 
concerns associated with this preliminary design. What follows in this chapter is a 
presentation of conclusions drawn from the project and possible areas for future work. 
This thesis centered on finding a suitable COTS digital signal processor for use in 
a radiation environment as well as the implications of using that digital signal processor 
in a Triple-Modulated-Redundant design. The '6701 was selected out of two of the 
industry's top 32-bit floating-point digital signal processors. To ensure the viability of the 
'6701, a detailed analysis of possible effects of SEU on the '6701 was performed. From 
the analysis it was determined that most errors would be detectable on either the data bus 
or the address bus. Errors that were either not detectable or undetermined were located in 
proprietary reserved locations within control registers. These bits are often ignored and 
cannot cause errors, but without detailed design information, it is impossible to determine 
this with 100 percent certainty. As stated in Chapter in, undetermined and not detectable 
errors were ignored. 
From the detailed analysis, it was demonstrated that the '6701 was suitable for use 
in a TMR system. Every effort has been made to ensure maximum design flexibility by 
using several possible memory types with the glueless architecture of the '6701. From 
this, it was determined that any asynchronous SRAM or synchronous burst SRAM is 
usable with a TMR architecture. It was also determined that synchronous burst DRAM 
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was unacceptable. Furthermore, some special considerations were taken into account, 
because of the use of on-chip SRAM. Since data errors would be detected, only after 
numerous calculations were completed, and it would be pointless then to halt the 
processor (by perform an interrupt handling routine), data errors would be counted vice 
causing immediate interrupts. Additionally, it was learned that these data errors would 
most likely occur during the block transfer of data from internal SRAM to an external 
memory location.  On the other hand, address errors would cause an immediate interrupt 
and be serviced as a number one priority. Thus, address errors in the '6701 would be 
treated with the same urgency as in past projects [Ref. 2 and 3]. A system schematic, 
Appendix B, was also designed to incorporate the '6701 into a TMR system. It was 
designed for maximum flexibility and to minimize restrictions placed upon the system by 
the TMR architecture that normally is not present in a traditional '6701 implementation. 
B.        CONCLUSIONS 
During this project, several digital signal processors were reviewed for a fault 
tolerant computing system. The TFM TMS320C6701 was selected for a triple modular 
redundant system. 
It was found that the '6701 architecture is suitable for this application because it is 
possible to insert a majority voting system on the system busses and still maintain a 
relatively fast read and write cycle.    It was also determined that the TMR system 
impacted the use of the '6701 by slowing the read/write cycle. A detailed, hand analysis 
of the read/write cycle was preformed to ensure proper timing and bus control. The hand 
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analysis provides proof that the system can be operated at a higher clock speed than 
current radhard devices. 
It was found that the TMR system using the '6701 will operate at 120 MHz 
internal clock rate compare to the radhard RH-21020 which operates at 40 MHz. The 
'6701 will be able to operate its SBSRAM memory bus at 40 MHz as compared with the 
RH-21020 that has an operating external memory bus speed of 20 MHz. 
Data errors and address errors should be treated separately. Only address errors 
should be addressed immediately, to ensure the system does not branch to an undefined or 
out of sequence location. Data errors are counted. When they exceed a threshold, the 
design causes a processor interrupt and resynchronizes the system. 
C.       FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
To complete this project, the TMS320C6701 must be tested in a radiation 
environment. Total ionization dose, single event latchup and single event burnout must 
be determined. The '6701 must also have an acceptable single-event-upset rate. If the 
error rate is too high, the system will spend much of its time handling interrupts and less 
of its time processing data. The number of SEU errors that the TMR design can tolerate 
will have to be determined. 
Once the '6701 has been validated for a radiation environment, the voting design 
should be transferred into a programmable logic device. An operating system must then 
be modified to provide an interrupt handling routine that deals with voting errors. Since 
memory errors can perpetuate for long periods, the operating system should also update 
constants that are stored in on-chip memory to ensure the constants due not become 
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corrupted. By updating the internal memory locations that store constants with a DMA 
channel periodically, data errors may be kept to a minimum. Once a system is built, 
testing should be done to determine the level of data errors that can be permitted before it 
has serious adverse influences on the system's fault tolerant performance. 
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APPENDIX A. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SEU ON THE TMS320C6701 
This appendix contains a detailed review how SEU might affect the performance 
of the '6701. Registers will be examined as to how they might be corrupted by an SEU 
and how that event will be detected and corrected. This detailed review is provided to 
ensure all possible effects of SEU can be detected. 
Address Mode Register 
31                                                  26 25 21 20 16 
Reserved BK1 BK2 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 65 43 21 
B7 mode    B6 mode    B5 mode    B4 mode    A7 mode    A6 mode A5 mode    A4 mode 
Figure 21. Address Mode Register (Bits 31:26 shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error in the shaded region (Figure 21) will cause an 
undetermined error. 
Detection of error: With the data provided by the technical documentation, it is 
not possible to determine how to detect an error in this region. 
31                                                  26 25                                      21 20 16 
Reserved BK1 BK2 
15 14 13 12 11 109 
B7 mode    B6 mode    B5 mode    B4 mode    A7 mode    A6 mode 
8 7 65 43 21 
A5 mode    A4 mode 
Figure 22. Address Mode Register (Bits 25:16 shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error in the shaded region (Figure 22) will cause an address 
generation error (either causing a circular addressing to terminate too early or late). 
Detection of error: It can only be done when addressing an external memory 
location. Internal memory address errors will be undetectable. 
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31 26 25 21 20 16 
Reserved BK1 BK2 
15           1413          1211           109              8|7              65              43              21               0 
B7 mode B6 mode B5 mode B4 mode   |A7 mode A6 mode A5 mode A4 mode 
Figure 23. Address Mode Register (Bits 15:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error in the shaded region (Figure 23) will cause an address 
generation error. If any of the shaded regions go to 1 lb, the error will result in an 
undetermined error 
Detection of error: Only when addressing an external memory location. Internal 
memory locations errors will be undetectable. 
Control Status Register 
31 24 23 16 
CPU ID Revision ID 
15 10 
PWRD SAT EN PCC DCC 
1 
PGIEGIE 
Figure 24. Control Status Register (Bits 31:16 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Errors in the shaded region (Figure 24) will cause instructions 
to be misinterpreted by the processor or cause an interrupt for invalid entry. This will 
lead to either an address error or data error. 






PWRD SAT EN PCC DCC PGIE GIE 
Figure 25. Control Status Register (Bits 15:10 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error in the shaded region (Figure 25) is always read as zero. 
Detection of error: No error can occur. 
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31                                                                24 23                                                                16 
CPU ID Revision ID 
15                                              10 9 8 7                      5|4                      2 1 0 
PWRD SAT EN PCC         |         DCC PGIEGIE 
Figure 26. Control Status Register (Bit 9 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Errors in the shaded region (Figure 26) cause an undesirable 
trap: Usually zero unless a computational unit is saturated (overflows). 
• 
Detection of error: When a trap occurs, an instruction will be fetched from 
memory. This access from memory will usually reside in an external memory location. 
31                                                                   24 23                                                                   16 
CPU ID Revision ID 
15                                                10 9 8 7                      54                      2 1 0 
PWRD SAT EN PCC DCC PGIEGIE 
Figure 27. Control Status Register (Bit 8 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: An error in the shaded region (Figure 27) will result in an 
ENDIAN format change. 
Detection of error: When data is written to external memory locations, the error 
can be detected. Errors will not be detectable when writing to internal memory. 
31                                                                   24 23                                                                16 
CPU ID Revision ID 
15                                                10 9 8 7                      5 4                       2 1 0 
PWRD SAT EN PCC DCC PGIE GIE 
be 
dc 
Figure 28. Conti 
Affects of an error: An errc 
havior of the '6701's program m 
es not apply to '6701. 
"olSt 






Register (Bits 7:2 Shaded). 
ided region (Figure 28) will cause the 
he (PCC Field) to change. The DCC f ield 
Detection of error: Change in the program cache may result in address misses, or a 
cache flush. Eventually, the deviation between processors treatment of internal program 
memory/cache will result in the address misses no matter what state the PCC change too. 
31 24 23 16 
CPU ID Revision ID 
15 10 9 8 7 54 2 1 0 
PWRD SAT EN PCC DCC PGIEGIE 
Figure 29. Control Status Register (Bits 1:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: An error in the shaded region (Figure 29) causes a change in 
how global interrupts executed or disabled the global interrupts. Potential problem if GEE 
is changed to zero from a one, all maskable interrupts are disabled. 
Detection of error: When an interrupt occurs usually an address is generated and 
therefore can be detected by the address read. 
E1 Phase Program Counter 
31 0 
(PCE1) 
Figure 30. Phase Program Counter (Bits 31:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: An error in the shaded region (Figure 30) will cause the wrong 
code to be executed. 
Detection of error: When code is not in on chip memory/cache, an address request 
will go out to external memory location. It will also be detected when the processors go 
out of lock-step operations. 
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Floating-Point Adder Configuration Register (FADCR) 
Fields used by .L2 
31                           27 26   25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 
NAN 
1 








1 Figure 31. Float-Point Adder Configuration Register (Bites 31:27,15 
Shaded). 
Affects of an error: No error occurs if bit fields from Figure 31 are corrupted 
Detection of error: None. 
Fields used by .L2 
31                           27 26   25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 
NAN 
1 
Fields used by .L1 
15                          11 10     9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 
NAN 
1 
Figure 32. Float-Point Adder Configuration Register (Bits 26,25,10,9 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: An error in the shaded region (Figure 32) causes rounding 
errors during computations. 
Detection of error: When data is written to external memory locations, the LSB 
may differ. 
Fields used by ,L2 
31 27 
Reserved 
26   25 
RMode 





























Figure 33. Float-Point Adder Configuration Register (Bits 24:16,8:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Errors in the shaded field (Figure 33) will cause either 
branching error (if any of the values are tested) or a trap may occur. 
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Detection of error: When a wrong branch is taken or wrong trap taken an address 
will be requested and detection occurs by an address error. 
Floating-Point Auxiliary Configuration 
Fields used by .S2 
Register (FAUCR) 
31         27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved DIVO UNORD Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 NAN1 











Figure 34. Floating-Point Auxiliary Configuration Register (Bits 31:27,15:11 
Shaded). 
Affects of an error: No error. (Figure 34) 
Detection of error: None. 
Fields used by ,S2 
31          27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved DIVO UNORD Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 NAN1 
Fields used by .S1 
15         11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Reserved DIVO UNORD Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 NAN1 
Figure 35. Floating-Point Auxiliary Configuration Register (Bits 26:16,10:0 
Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error field (Figure 35) could cause false branches or no error 
at all. 
Detection of error: If a false branch is taken then it will likely execute wrong code 
and will make an address request off chip. 
Fields used by .M2 
31                     27 26   25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 NAN1 






Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 
1 
DEN1   NAN2 NAN1 
Figure 36. Floating-Point Multiplier Configuration Register (Bits 31:27, 
15:llShaded). 
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Affects of an error: No error. (Figure 36) 
Detection of error: No error 
Fields used by .M2 
31                      27 26   25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 NAN2 NAN1 
Fields used by .M1 
15                    11 10     9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2    |    1 0 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 DEN1 |NAN2 NAN1 
Figure 37. Floating-Point Multiplier Configuration Register (Bits 26:25, 
10:9 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Errors in the shaded (Figure 37) will cause rounding errors 
during computations. 
Detection of error: When data is written to external memory location. 
Fields used by .M2 
31                     27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
Reserved RMode Under INEX Over Info? Inval DEN2 DEN1. NAN2NAN1 
Fields used by .M1 
15                   11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1    I    0 
Reserved RMode Unden INEX Over Info Inval DEN2 OEN1 NAN2INAN1 
Figure 38. Float-Point Multiplier Configuration Register (Bits 24:16,8:0 
Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error could cause false branches or no error at all. (Figure 38) 
Detection of error: A false branch is taken then it will likely execute the wrong 
code and will make an address request off chip. 
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General format for control 
Operations on the .M 
registers for each computation unit 
31     29 28 27 23 22 18 17                 13 12 11 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 0 0 0 0 0 s p 
Operations on the .S 
31      29 28 27 23 22 18 17                 13 12 11 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg 2 dst src2 srd/cst X op 1 0 0 0 s P 
Operations on the .D 
31      29 28 27 23 22 18 17                 13 12 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst op 1 0 0 0 0 s P 
Operations on the .L 
31      29 28 27 23 22 18 17                  13 12 11 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 1 1 0 s P 
Figure 39. General Control Registers (Bits 31:29 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Effects are undetermined. (Figure 39) (Not defined in the 
manual) 
Detection of error: Unknown. 
Operations < Dn the .M 
31     29 28 27           23 22            18 17              13 12 11 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 0 0 0 0 0 S P 
Operations on the .S 
31     29 28 27           23 22           18 17              13 12 11 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 1 0 0 0 s P 
Operations on the .D 
31     29 28 27           23 22           18 17              13 12 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst op 1 0 0 0 0 s P 
Operations on the .L 
31     29 28 27 23 22 18 17 13  12  11 5  4   3   2    1    0 
creg dst src2 srd/cst _op_ 1 | 1 |0|s| p 
Figure 40. General Control Registers (Bits 28:1X Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error will cause either an address calculation error or a data 
error, because a wrong register is either used to stored data or the data is written into the 
wrong register. (Figure 40) 
Detection of error: If a wrong address is generated, it will cause an address error 
interrupt when the address is fetched. For data errors, error will not be detected until it is 
written to external memory location. 
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Operations < 3n the .M 
31     29 28 27            23 22            18 17              13 12 11 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 0 0 0 0 0 '&? P Operations on the .S 
31     29 28 27           23 22            18 17              13 12 11 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 1 0 0 0 s P 
Operations on the .D 
31     29 28 27            23 22            18 17              13 12 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst op 1 0 0 0 0 %.'. p 
Operations on the .L 
31     29 
creg 








Figure 41. General Control Registers (Bits X:X,1 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Errors that cause wrong operation will be executed and may 
cause the processors to go out of synchronization. (Figure 41) 
Detection of error: Either address error or data error, and since execution of 
various opcodes take different amounts clock cycle, the processors will quick go out of 
sync. 
Operations < Dn the .M 
31     29 28 27           23 22           18 17              13 12 11 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst X op 0 0 0 0 0 s P Operations on the .S 
31     29 
creg 









31     29 28 27           23 22            18 17              13 12 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
creg z dst src2 srd/cst op 1 0 0 0 0 s m 
Operations on the .L 
31     29 
creg 








Figure 42. General Control Registers (Bit 0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error causes either code to be executed in parallel or not in 
parallel. Has no effect on data or addresses. (Figure 42) 
Detection of error: Processors will go out of sync and therefore have address and 
data errors on the external bus accesses. 
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Interrupt Service Table Pointer (ISTP) 
31 10 9                      5 4 3 2 1 0 
ISTB HPEINT 0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 43. Interrupt Service Table Pointer (Bits 31:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error causes an interrupt to occur and is going to branch to the 
interrupt table in memory, it will branch to the wrong location in memory. (Figure 43) 
Detection of error: Processor will put an invalid address on the bus conflicting 
with the other processors. 














IE10 IE9 IE8 IE7 IE6 IE5 IE4 Rsvd Rsvd 
figure 44. Interrupt Enable Register (Bits 31:16,3,2 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Unknown. (Figure 44) 
Detection of error: Undetermined. 















IE10 IE9 IE8 IE7 IE6 IE5 IE4 Rsvd Rsvd 
1 
NMEI    1 
0 
Figure 45. Interrupt Enable Register (Bits 15:4,1 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error causes an interrupt (Figure 45) 
Detection of error: An interrupt will not occur when the other two processors 
execute an interrupt and put out an address request to execute that interrupt. 
Interrupt Set Register 
31 16 
Reserved 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
IS15 IS14 IS13 IS12 IS11 IS10 IS9 IS8 IS7 IS6 IS5 IS4 Rsvd Rsvd Rsvd Rsvd 
Figure 46. Interrupt Set Register (Bits 31:16,3:0 Shaded). 
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Affects of an error: Unknown. (Figure 46) 
Detection of error: Not defined. 
31                                                                                                                         16 
Reserved 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
IS15 IS14 IS13 IS12 IS11 IS10 IS9 IS8 IS7 IS6 IS5 IS4 Rsvd Rsvd Rsvd Rsvd 
Figure 47. Interrupt Set Register (Bits 15:4 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: No error (Figure 47) (Only indicates if an interrupt has 
occurred.) 
Detection of error: No need. (Only used to set interrupt flag register.) 
Interrup Clear Register (ICR) 
31                                                                                                                                                16 
Reserved 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4   1   3 2 1 0 
IC15 IC14 IC13 IC12 IC11 IC10 IC9 IC8 IC7 IC6 IC5 IC4 |f?svd Rsvd Rsvd Rsvd 
Figure 48. Interrupt Clear Register (Bits 31:1 6,3:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Unknown. (Figure 48) 
Detection of error: Undetermined. 
31                                                                                                                                         16 
Reserved 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Rsvd 101.5- IG14 [013 1012 IGIt lOfo: 109 IG8 1G7 106 105 104 Rsvd Rsvd Rsvd 
Figure 49. Interrupt Clear Register (I Hts 15:4 S laded). 
Affects of an error: None (Only used to clear interrupt flag register.) (Figure 49) 
Detection of error: When control register is written to an external memory 
location. 
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NMI Return Pointer (NRP) 
31 
NRP 
Figure 50. NMI Return Pointer (Bits 31:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error cause program to branch bake to wrong location. (Figure 
50) 
Detection of error: Processor out of sync will produce address request that are 
invalid. 
Interrupt Return Pointer (IRP) 
31 0 
IRP 
Figure 51. Interrupt Return Pointer (Bits 31:0 Shaded). 
Affects of an error: Error causes program to branch to a wrong location. (Figure 
51) 
Detection of error: Processor out of sync will produce address requests that are 
invalid. 
82 
APPENDIX B. THE SCHEMATIC OUT LINE OF THE TMR SYSTEM 
This appendix will provide the detailed schematic of the TMR using three 
TMS320C6701. The highest level of system will be used followed by the subsystem that 
makes up each block. 
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Figure 53. General Memory Architecture. 
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Figure 54. '6701 TMR Design. 
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Figure 55. Schematic of Three '6701 Wired in Parallel. 
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Figure 57. Data Buffer. 
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Figure 60. Address Voter. 
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Figure 61. CE Voter. 
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Figure 63. BE Voter. 
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Figure 64. Control Signal Voter. 
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